1

Between 1866 and 1871, thanks to the skilful diplomacy of Prussia's great minister, Prince Otto von Bismarck and to the unexcelled military genius of his generals, Albrecht von Roon and Helmuth von Moltke; the situation in what had been the German confederation was completely altered. During the first half of its existence, the confederation had been dominated by the Austrian Hapsburgs. As a result of Prussia's decisive victory in the Austro- Prussian war of 1866, the Austrian Empire was expelled from the confederation and a new North German Confederation was created under a greatly enlarged Prussia.1 By taking advantage of a wave of chauvinism in France, Otto von Bismarck contrived to bring about the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, in which the German states south of the Main fought as allies against France and at the close of which they joined, in January 1871, with the states of the North German Confederation to establish the German Empire. The Second Teutonic Reich was forged out of 'blood and iron'; a prophetic slogan for such a young nation state whose foreign policy would always be oriente

2

between themselves and another great European power. Russia was not the only country who was threatened by this expansionism. Many of the world's great leaders of the time believed that the only way to attack and fatally wound Britain with a ground assault would be to attack her in Egypt.14 Germany could never dream of attacking Egypt until Turkey was mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria. This common thread between Russia and Britain, predicated upon a fear of German expansion, was on of the precursors of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Alliance.

6

All the evidence suggested that it was mainly German which pushed for war. Without Germanys drive to extend her hegemony, a major war would not have started in Europe in 1914. However, it must be stated that German aspirations of this nature had existed for sometime with out war being the end result.27 If it had not been for the Austrian initiative in early July and the Russian decision to remain firm and call what was perceived an Austrian bluff towards the end of that month, Berlin would have found it difficult to push for a war in the summer of 1914. Austrian determination and Russian firmness suited German intentions.

decades to determine causation. Previous wars, especially that of 1870 which had established German military predominance in Europe and left the French with a grievance over the loss of Alsace and Lorraine had set the groundwork within which the international relations of the first years of the twentieth century were to be conducted.29 Added to this the imperialism of the 1880's and 1890's had produced, especially in Britain and Germany, a great deal of antagonism between the two powers. In Germany, the concept of expansionism based primarily on military glory, found enough support to gain mass support from the leaders of every aspect of Germany.30 It was this consensus which was not present in any other nation that was to serve as the impetus for war.

Whatever German interests were affected in Morocco in 1905 and 1911, that would warrant action such as the intervention of the gunboat Panther and the violence and Tangier and Agadir were in themselves very odious. The crux of the argument lay in Germany's desire for an open-door economic policy in Morocco. The necessity of fresh and unrestricted markets was vital to German trade and therefore to the whole political and military system.8 German actions in Morocco were an extension of this policy to increase German hegemony over world affairs vis-a-vis economic control. This in turn brought her into ideological conflict with Britain. Moreover, German policy did not only attempted to enforce her own position, but also to enfeeble the world powers on her own borders.9 France's foreign relations had worked antagonistically to that of Germany; with the former finding herself isolated in the 1880's as a result of German alliances. However in the 1900's, France found spheres of influence as a result of the Entente Cordial of 1904 and the Franco Russian Alliance of 1894. In France, the consensus was that Germany had intervened in matters that did not concern her and as a result, France undertook an ambitious army development program in order to take a stronger stand in any future crisis with Germany. As a result, the Germans evoked feelings of suspicion, thus creating an environment that was more contusive to the outbreak of war.10 Britain, via her foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey, saw German actions as a threat to her naval

sufficient deterrent to forego further conflict with Austria.23 The French warning against mobilization came too late for the Russians, for as they feared, Russian mobilization would give Germany a valid pretext for a declaration of war. Germany wasted little time in grasping the

Some common words found in the essay are:
William Hohenzollern, Teutonic Reich, Austrian Empire, France Russia, Anglo-Russian Alliance, Dual Monarchy, Russia European, Prince Otto, Tangier Agadir, German Empire, foreign policy, otto von bismarck, summer 1914, otto von, von bismarck, ottoman empire, william hohenzollern, dual monarchy, kaiser william, german actions, prince otto, prince otto von, german foreign office, entente cordial 1904, drang nach osten,
Approximate Word count = 2759
Approximate Pages = 11 (250 words per page double spaced)