History Atomic Bomb essay
In early August 1945 atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These two bombs quickly yielded the surrender of Japan and the end of American involvement in World War II. By 1946 the two bombs caused the death of perhaps as many as 240,000 Japanese citizens1. The popular, or traditional, view that dominated the 1950s and 60s - put forth by President Harry Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson - was that the dropping of the bomb was a diplomatic maneuver aimed at intimating and gaining the upper hand in relations with Russia. Today, fifty-four years after the two bombings, with the advantage of historical hindsight and the advantage of new evidence, a third view, free of obscuring bias and passion, can be presented. First, the dropping of the bomb was born out of complex infinite military, domestic and diplomatic pressures and concerns. Second, many potentially viable alternatives to dropping the bombs were not explored by Truman and other men in power, as they probably should have been. Lastly, because these alternatives were never explored, we can only conjecture over whether or not Truman's decision was a morally just one, and if indeed it was necessary to use atomic energy to win the
A non-combat demonstration would have entailed either dropping the bomb in a desolate area with international observers or the dropping of the bomb on an unpopulated area of Japan. This alternative was brought up twice, once on May 31st 1945 at the Interim Committee Lunch and again in the Frank committee report on Jun 11, 194532. The recommendation by the scientific Panel (presided over by the four principal physicists involved in the Manhattan Project--Fermi, Lawrence, Compton and Oppenheimer) was to use the bomb only in "direct military use33." Stimson, Truman, Byrnes, and others collectively embraced this recommendation because they feared that the bomb might turn out to be a "dud" and thus prove counterproductive toward intimidating the Japanese. Also because there was a severe limit to the materials on hand, as Stimson later wrote, "we had no bombs to waste34." Thus this alternative was not pursued, for the logistical obstacles were thought to be difficult to overcome, and allied military and political advisors were not sure the observers would be allowed to report the demonstration to the Japanese emperor accurately. The second alternative to dropping the bomb would have been modify the American demand for the unconditional surrender so as to guarantee the continuance of the Japanese emperor. Many American officials believed that this was the single issue restraining the peace factions in Japan. After consulting with Joseph Grew and Harry Hopkins, who both believed that Japan was already on the verge of defeat, admiral Leahy recommended to Truman on June 18th 1945 that the demand for unconditional surrender be modified. Truman commented that he would think about it, but voiced concern over "public opinion on this matter35." Secretary Stimson concurred, and in his July 2nd 1945, memorandum to Truman, he wrote that he advised adding he clause that while the United Sates demand a "peacefully inclined government," they would "not exclude a constitutional monarchy under [Japan's] present dynasty.36" In the end Truman did not accept this recommend, and the Potsdam Deceleration was released without any mention of the Japanese Emperor37. Truman made this decision because he feared that such a modification might "embolden the Japanese to fight on for better terms38." Ironically, when Japan's surrender was accepted on August 14th, the Emperor was allowed to remain in power. Thus, this alternative to dropping the bomb was eventually embraced, but only after the bombs dropped, when it was no longer an alternative. After the dropping of the bombs President Truman, Secretary of War Stimson and others claimed that the military pressures discussed above were the only reason for deciding to drop the bombs. Stimson wrote, "At no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war, " and also added, "The entire purpose was the production of a military weapon.12" Thus the traditional view was established, the bomb was a legitimate weapon of war and used only for military purposes. The simplistic military view was furthered by press releases in the weeks following the bombings. For example, the New York Times, quoted Truman on August 7th with phrases such as, "Hiroshima was a major military target," and, "We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history-and won.13" These phrases and others gave readers the single-sided view that the bomb was dropped for military reasons, and through the entirety of the 1940s and 1950s no other major contradictory statement of any kind as ever made. The praising and glorifying of the scientists involved which filled the paper after the bombs were dropped. Truman implied the bomb was something for which the American people should be proud of. In hindsight it appears as if there existed five major alternatives to the dropping of the ato
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Approximate Word count = 3593
Approximate Pages = 14 (250 words per page double spaced)
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