The Motives and Misfortunes of the Second Athenian Expedition to Sicily, 415 to 413 B.C.
In investigating the siege of Syracuse by the second Athenian expedition to Sicily, one must establish the Athenian's motives for undertaking such a large expedition, the nature and composition of the expedition itself, the political conflicts and compromises which from the outset reduced its chances of success, and Athen's ignorance of Sicilian affairs which led them to underestimate the strength of their enemies and overestimate the support they would receive from their allies. This essay is not an account of the events of the war itself, which is easily available elsewhere, but of the causes and motives behind the events as we know them. Thucydides' account of the war is almost our sole contemporary source, supplemented here and there by the fragments of other accounts and by modern archaeology.As outlined in H.D. Westlake's essay Athenian Aims In Sicily, Athenian interests in Italy and Sicily changed rapidly after the death of Pericles. It is clear from the many passages in Thucydides that "Greeks at home and in Sicily never dismissed... the possibility of naval support being received by the Peloponnesians from their western allies,"1 but the aim of Pericles' strategy in the west seems to have been only partly to prevent thi
Aristophanes, The Acharnians and The Knights in Aristophanes Vol. I, trans. B.B. Rogers, William Heinemann Ltd., London, U.K.;1967 A History of Greece to 322 B.C., The Clarendon Press, Oxford, U.K.;1967 Hammond, N.G.L. and Scullard, H.H., (eds) Pericles apparently believed that if demand [for food] could be so much increased [in the Peloponnesus] by means of repeated plundering raids that it could no longer be met by imports, some coastal states, where the distress would be most acutely felt, might be impelled to desert the Spartan cause.3 Once the three had agreed to Alcibiades' spectacular and difficult plan, still more political interference endangered the success of the expedition. Alcibiades was recalled to Athens to face charges brought by his political enemies, namely that he was responsible for disfiguring busts of Hermes around the city on the eve of the expedition's departure. Thucydides, who generally ignored any event or detail which he considered irrelevant to the story of the Peloponnesian war (much to the frustration of modern historians), described Alcibiades' recall in great detail, including his subsequent defection to Sparta and his warning to Syracusan allies in Messana of a pro-Athenian revolt planned in that city. Alcibiades' recall to Athens left Nicias and Lamachus leading the expedition, following a plan which neither favoured, and possibly unable to agree on how to execute it. The first, defensive motive was strictly in line with Periclean strategy, which still enjoyed wide support in Athens. The second, offensive motive was the product of the demagogues and the ambitious rivalries of Pericles' successors. Although the first motive seems to have enjoyed the widest support in the Ecclesia when the first expedition of twenty triremes left Athens, the break with Periclean strategy was much more complete when it was later reinforced with forty more. Westlake argues that
Some common words found in the essay are:
Italy Sicily, Nicias Nicias', Nicias Alcibiades, Sicily Greeks, Thucydides Greeks, Carthage Athens25, Egesta Seluntinians, Nicias Lamachus, Alcibiades Nicias, Syracuse Athenian, periclean strategy, alcibiades nicias, allies west, nicias alcibiades, press oxford, sicilian cities, clarendon press oxford, athenian allies, clarendon press, heinemann ltd london, purpose expedition, military aid, william heinemann ltd, generals alcibiades nicias, raids 431 430,
Approximate Word count = 3287
Approximate Pages = 13 (250 words per page double spaced)
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