Sparta was the epitome of military strength in the 10th century B.C. and seemed invincible from all perspectives. The Spartan army was superlative, and it won battle after battle. However, Sparta did event

Sparta's shortsightedness was essentially an incomplete thought process, where it got an idea or an impression and went forward with it without any further investigation or reflection. It carries with it a degree of impulsiveness, since further thought probably would have prevented Sparta's shortsightedness in many instances. The reason for the repeated episodes of shortsightedness was primarily Sparta's inherent belief that it was alright right on every issue and did not need to listen to anyone else or submit to anything. This brand of hubris seemed to brand everything Sparta undertook in its road to decline, and had it been mitigated with some humility, Sparta might have sustained its superiority longer.

The Spartans by this time were becoming desperate, as their dominion was obviously crumbling rapidly. Their defeat at Leuctra sparked an exodus from Spartan domination, whereby many of the Peloponnesian states challenged the pro-Spartan oligarchies. Anti-Spartan alliances developed within the Peloponnese, and the Thebans invaded Sparta and ravaged Laconia (Buckley, 1996, 451-452). In the end, as a result of its many shortsighted decisions, Sparta endured significant decline in the fourth century.

Four hundred Spartiates, including Cleombrotus, were killed at Leuctra - over a third of the Spartan citizen body. Although neither side knew it at the time, this battle was one of the turning-points in Greek history: the Spartans, who had been so dominant in Greek politics for two and a half centuries, were about to be reduced to the status of a second-rate power (Buckley, 1996, 449).

Xenophon, a pro-Spartan historian, states in his book Hellenica that Sparta declined because it "incurred the wrath of the gods by going against their sworn oath 'to leave the cities independent' by seizing the Theban Acropolis, the Cadmea, in 382 B.C. (Scipio, 2005). While this may not be a historically legitimate assertion in terms of the Greek gods, there is a possibility that the wrongs Sparta engaged in for the sake of winning did end up undermining it, as civilizations that begin engaging in wrong historically tend toward downfall, as though someone really were watching and repaying them for their evils.

Sparta failed to foresee what happened next as a result of its ill treatment of its allies. Boeotia became a third power commensurate with Athens and Sparta, and a major force in Greek politics. Boeotia regained its independence from Athens in 447 at the Battle of Coroneia and restored the Boeotian League, which became the source of their strength. The Boeotian League was a federal league comprising members for the federal Council-the primary decision-making body of the Boeotians (Buckley, 1996, 443). From this point onward, Boeotia's military prowess also grew, and an eventual confrontation between Sparta and Boeotia was inevitable. In a confrontation over the Peace of 371, the Spartans suffered a terrible defeat:

Another factor in Sparta's decline was the rise of mercenary armies-troops hired and paid to fight-in use by the Greeks. The Greeks were not keen to leave their own territory undefended while they went to battle against Sparta, so they began using mercenaries

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