Anonymous Juries in the Canadian Judicial System
The Canadian and essentially North American criminal justice system has traditionally made the identities and addresses of jurors known to the judge, the prosecution, and the defense solely. That tradition began to erode with the unprecedented sua sponte trial court decision to use an anonymous jury in the case of United States v. Barnes and lead to similar precedent in Canada with the case of The Crown v. Diroguay, two highly publicized criminal trials of notorious organized crime figures in New York City and Toronto respectively. Since "Barnes," Federal prosecutors in New York haverequested and been granted anonymous juries in a number of similar cases, a development which has generated criticism. On the other hand, anonymous juries have been employed across Canada ever since as more and more local systems adopt the precedent. This paper first addresses the issue of whether juror anonymity violates a defendant's right to a jury trial by adversely affecting the defendant's ability to exercise effectively peremptory challenges during voir dire. It also discusses the effect an anonymous jury may have on the presumption that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Also considered are attempts by trial judges, through partic
Unlike security measures that unequivocally point to the defendant, juror anonymity could be perceived to address potential disturbances wholly unrelated to the defendant. Yet, critics of the anonymous jury contend that prospective jurors could only read the anonymity instruction to be a judicial conclusion of the defendant's guilt.8 Therefore, they cannot obey the contradictory instruction to presume the defendant innocent until the governnment meets its burden of proof. Although plausible, this conclusion necessarily depends on certain unsupported assumptions about juror perception and knwledge. Assuming that the anonymity instruction signals the jury that the defendants might "get" to them, critics of anonymous juries ignore a likely consequence of that perception. A juror who anticipates a defendant's retaliation would be more likely to return a guilty verdict despite such fears rather than because of them. Thus, even if anonymity incidentally instills the fear it attempts to remedy, the result arguably benefits the defendant by making jurors afraid to convict. On the other hand, if anonymity helps to remedy existing fears, it serves the ideal of dispassionate judgement. Although a defendant would understandably welcome a trial before a jury biased toward an acquittal, the people, as well as the defendant, are entitled to an impartial jury. Another premise underlying the need for anonymous juries is that certain defendants or their sympathizers are likely to corrupt or intimidate the jury. Critics assert that courts accept this premise despite a "total absence of any evidence of jury tampering, contacts, lest defendants be cast in a negative light. Indeed, many convicted defendants successfully argue on appeal that the jury was either not adequately cautioned to avoid outside influence or that juror contact with third parties prejudiced the defendant's case. One writer has argued that equal access to information about the jury panel is crucial to a fair voir dire.7 He noted that, in the past, prosecutors have had unilateral access to governmental agency data on prospective jurors.Thus, the prosecution enjoys a potential systemic advantage in every case. He concludes that a relatively broad voir dire is necessary to remedy this institutional disparity. One might more readily conclude, however, that anonymous juries remedy this systemic inequality. Without names and addresses, prosecutors could not take advantage of the superior informational and investigative resources of the government. Anonymity thus ensures that both sides are on equal footing with regard to information about prospective jurors. Unfortunately, the court also endorsed concealing from the jury the real reason for anonymity. The principal justfication offered for anonymity was to prevent jury tampering, but the court approved an instruction that deliberately made no mention of that, only of the necessity to protect jurors from "unwanted and undesirable publicity and embarrassment and notoriety and any access to you which would interfere with preserving your sworn duty to fairly, impartially and independently serve as jurors.11 By instructing a jury that anonymity prevents the media and interes
Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 2162
Approximate Pages = 9 (250 words per page double spaced)
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