The principle of "common human dignity" appears to play a central role in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty as punishment. But because "common human dignity" cannot be precisely defined, other considerations - such as whether capital punishment is acceptable to society, whether the death penalty is administered in an even-handed way, and whether the purported goals can be met - are used as gauges.

In Furman v. Georgia (1972), for example, the Supreme Court used the "common human dignity" principle as the basis for a test of a Georgia statute regarding capital punishment. In this case, the Supreme Court not only determined that the statute unfairly administered the death penalty, it also deemed capital punishment impermissible.

The Supreme Court roughly measured "common human dignity" in terms of the pain that a punishment would exact, and a vague maxim that "humans not be treated as non-humans," adding three additional principles to ascertain whether capital punishment passed the "human dignity" test. In the Furman c

In How to Argue About the Death Penalty, Hugo Bedau argues that all of the arguments so far examined still exhibit at least one fatal flaw - none of the goals or principles can point with certainty to a conclusive reason to favor either side of the dispute over capital punishment. Thus, no rational resolution is possible for the controversy. The facts as we know them do not overwhelmingly point to the futility of the death penalty, nor do they indicate that capital punishment is the only means to obtaining the goals of crime reduction, economy, rectifying harm and injustice caused by crime, or channeling public indignation at the offender. There remains little or no evidence that the death penalty is a better deterrent to murder than imprisonment. Capital punishment may still be administered in an arbitrary way.

The notion of deterrence of potential criminals was flatly rejected as a proper goal of capital punishment. The Furman court indicated that a lack of sufficient statistical evidence reduced the goal to a "mere belief" that it was more effective than extended incarceration. The idea that a potential criminal might consider the possible ramifications of his acts was too abstract a notion to be of any import to substantiate the deterrence goal for capital punishment.

Bedau correctly articulates what the Gregg decision, the Furman decision, and Van Den Haag exemplify - that while we can assess goals and principles to come up with a decision regarding capital punishment, the outcome of these foundations depends ultimately upon the weight we give each element. Unfortunately, the several goals and principles that are identified in the debate have no obvious rank order or "proper" weighting. Without this, there is no rational resolution of the controversy possible.

Van Den Haag reasons that the elimination of one murderer by capital punishment will decrease the potential homicide rate. He also ascribes a higher importance to the safety of potential victims to that of rights of convicted murderers when he indicates that the remote possibility that the death penalty would deter a few men from committing murder makes the process a worthy one. In this light, according to Van Den Haag, no other threat can deter certain crimes, ones which are special because of their very nature - war crimes, international spies, and murders which occur in prison.

The Supreme Court also dismissed the goal of retribution for crimes committed as irrelevant. This goal, said the Furman court, cannot be the state's sole end for punishment - proper goals include measurable deterrent effects, isolation of persons dangerous to society, and rehabilitation. Since all three of the "proper" goals could be accomplished sufficiently through a less severe. less permanent punishment, such as extended incarceration, capital punishment was excessive.

First, the Furma

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