The Other Domino Effect

A detailed Summary of The Other Domino Effect

John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon did not define the importance of fighting communism in Vietnam in the same way. Each individual ascended to power at very different periods of U.S. involvement in the conflict, inheriting pressures ranging from omnipotent national theories and verbal commitments (i.e., the Kennedy administration) to tangible large-scale U.S. involvement (e.g., the Johnson administration and even more so the Nixon administration), which subsequently changed the importance of fighting communism from noble liberating ideology to the preservation of our vulnerable national prestige. In other words the perceived importance of fighting communism in Vietnam by these three presidents evolved from supporting political rhetoric to supporting dying American boys. Each attempted to follow the same strategy of involvement, in which the war should be won by the Vietnamese, and the U.S. should only be minimally involved until the South's government was resilient enough to support itself. Escalation of U.S. involvement occurred begrudgingly by each administration, but was inevitable due to the inertia of the situation (a domino effect of its own).

nce of freedom in South Vietnam, subscribing whole-heartedly to the Domino Theory and the U.S. containment policy. His convictions as to the importance of South Vietnam were pure and idealistic, exemplified by a 1961 statement: "Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the free world in Southeast Asia, the keystone in the arch, the finger in the dike...should the red tide of communism pour into it, much of Asia would be threatened" (Herring, p. 47). Although national pride was a significant issue in determining our involvement in 1961, U.S. commitment was at a minimum with only 675 advisers present at the time Kennedy was sworn into office. This placed an intangible pressure only on his ideals of U.S. foreign policy to persuade him towards escalading U.S. involvement. He had the choice to abandon his rhetoric and extricate the miniscule amount of our commitment without an extensive amount of tarnishing to our national prestige. But he felt it necessary to shine the spotlight on Vietnam, the stage in which the U.S. would perform its self-proclaimed duty as a liberator, to "let every nation know...that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty" (Lafeber, Polenberg, and Woloch, p. 401).

Nixon defined the importance of fighting communism in Vietnam solely upon ending the war in a way that would preserve national prestige. Total victory, at an acceptable cost, was realized to be impossible by the administration and the American public. Nixon felt it imperative to continue the commitment, which had been escalated exponentially by preceding administrations, but to set his vision in a foundation of ending the conflict quickly and honorably-"peace with honor" (Herring, p.243).

Nixon announced his strategy November 3, 1969, of Vietnamization, reiterating the steadfast philosophy of the U.S.-the war would need to be won by the South Vietnamese. Advisers worked frantically to build up and modernize the South Vietnamese army. The U.S. supplied huge quantities of the newest weapons to the ARVN, more than one million M-16 rifles, 12,000 M-60 machine guns, 40,000 M-79 grenade launchers, and 2,000 heavy mortars (Herring, p. 253). Also supplied were ships, planes, helicopters and vehicles at unprecedented levels. With growing public discontent Ni

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Approximate Word count = 1586
Approximate Pages = 6 (250 words per page double spaced)

Category: Politics