Pearl Harbor 2
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the Commander in Chief, of the United States' Pacific Fleet, was looking forward to a relaxing 9-hole round of golf. His match with General Walter Short was scheduled for 9:30A.M. Hawaii Time. One hour and 45 minutes before he was set to tee off, Kimmel received a phone call from Commander Vincent Murphy reporting the sighting of a Japanese submarine in the Pearl Harbor entry channel. Just as Kimmel was exiting his quarters, the USS Arizona burst into flames. The first wave of Japan's December 7th attack on Pearl Harbor lasted from 7:53 A.M.-8:25 A.M. First Oahu's marine airfields were bombed, crippling the island's air defenses. Commander Mitsuo Fuchida explained the Japanese strategy to first knock out the island's defense, then temporally disable the United States' Pacific fleet by "sinking battleships and aircraft carriers." Battleship Row, consisting of eight battleships, was first hit by torpedo-plane assault at 7:55a.m. At 8:10a.m the forward powder magazine of the USS Arizona exploded; 90% of her crew died. The USS Utah capsized at 8:12a.m. The USS Maryland did the same twenty minutes later. The second raid began at around nine just as Rear Admiral Walter Anderson arrived and began to
After Admiral Yamamoto laid out his attack plan of Pearl Harbor, he soon began to circulate it among trusted Japanese naval officers. Eventually the scheme was leaked to the US embassy in Tokyo. Max W. Bishop, third secretary of the embassy, was waiting in line to exchange some US money for some Yen, when he was tapped on the shoulder by Peruvian minister to Japan, Dr. Ricardo Rivera Schreiber. Shreiber told Bishop, "Japanese military forces were planning, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all their military resources." Bishop hurried back to the embassy, and had a message draft approved by State Department Ambassador Joseph Grew. A. Convince Britain to allow America's use of bases in the Pacific. B. Convince Holland for America's use of bases in the Dutch East Indies. The next morning, January 27, Secretary of State Cordell Hull read the message. Hull, then sent the message to Army Intelligence and the Office. McCollum received the message as proof that his insight policy had worked. Yet, rather than warning the Pacific Fleet, McCollum sent his take on what he called "rumors" to the newly appointed Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, "The division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of the Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future." This tip was far from the only hint of Pearl Harbor that the Americans got. The Japanese Foreign Ministry sent two messages on December 5, which stated that War between America and Japan would begin on December 7. United State's Interception stations US, CAST, and FIVE all intercepted the messages and decoded them in a matter of hours. Yet, there is no evidence that either message was forwarded to Hawaii. America's policy of avoiding hindering of Japan's first plain act of war is even more apparent in four diplomatic intercepts intercepted December 6 and 7. The first message sent by Tokyo to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura in Washington was a pilot message saying that Japan would reply to American-Japanese negotiations. The second message contained 13 parts of the reply, while the third message contained the 14th part. The last intercept set a deadline of 1:00 P.M. December 7th, for the Ambassador to sever Japanese relations with America. Washington's senior military leaders realized that 1:00 P.M. EST was 7:30 a.m. in Hawaii. President Roosevelt received all four translated intercepts over a twelve hour period from 9:30 P.M. Saturday December 6, and 10:A.M., December 7. Suspiciously delivery of these messages to Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall was delayed for fifteen hours. Yet, American knowledge of the upcoming Pearl Harbor Attack does not end here. Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa, a Japanese naval spy who went under the name Tadashi Morimura, on August 21, drew a bomb-map message of Pearl Harbor. This map had a detailed layout of where the ships at Pearl Harbor were located. The Intercept station US in Washington received this message and successfully decoded it. Captain Theodore Wilkinson Director of Naval Intelligence commented, "We were cognizant of the fact that espionage on the fleet was underway...." Later, on September 24, Tokyo made a request for a more detailed and precise bomb-map of Pearl Harbor. Yoshikawa completed this second map on Monday, September 29. Four United States spy stations; SAIL, CAST, Station TWO, and Station SEVEN intercepted both the request and map. The Pearl Harbor investigations have shown that this knowledge was treated with indifference. It continu
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Approximate Word count = 2505
Approximate Pages = 10 (250 words per page double spaced)
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