Escalation of Vietnam

A detailed Summary of Escalation of Vietnam

It is my observation that at this point in your administration you are enjoying considerable latitude with the American public. Your overwhelming victory in the recent election has illustrated your popularity. The platform on which you ran promised the American public that our boys would not be sent to die in Vietnam. If you are going to act on your word, and end the war in Vietnam, the time is now.

It is also my observation that your top aides having been overwhelming you with advice in the opposite direction. Your beloved Robert McNamara, whose opinion you value deeply, has made this war his personal project. He is guaranteeing that the war can be won within two and a half years. He has stated that there is no risk of a catastrophe. He and General Westmoreland feel confident that the war can be won. However, they have continually been asking for more and more troops since mid-1964. You have already agreed to send more marines and authorize offensive operations. If there is no limit set on the number of troops, it becomes easier and easier to keep sending them.

What is our clear military objective? Do our military leaders have a strategic plan for victory? Again in June, General Westmoreland ha

Mr. President, I realize that you are a man who rises to meet challenges and does not accept defeat. I also realize that in your role as president you feel obligated to continue on with the Cold War policies that have long given shape to U.S. Vietnam policy. I encourage you to reassess this policy and not feel obligated to continue down the wrong path. There are power stakes involved here, Mr. President, and quite frankly if you do not succeed by escalating, your presidency will become under fire, and you will never achieve your goals of the Great Society.

Mr. President, I need not remind you how fickle the American public has been on this issue. Before the Tonkin Gulf clash, almost two-thirds of the public knew little about Vietnam, and those who did were deeply divided. After the February 1965 bombing, several influential Americans and critics in the Senate began to speak out. By March, college campuses had broken out into protests with faculty teaching out against your policy. You have seen the effects of the Korean War on Truman's presidency. We have learned that the public has no taste for Asian land wars. If you choose to continue, you will be falling into your own portrayal of Senator Barry Goldwater whom you ruthlessly depicted as a man leading the American troops into a dangerous conflict.

It must feel natural to continue at this point of the war. You have public approval for the bombing and escalation. Congress has proved their support by the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and has confirmed its intentions in May by offering overwhelming support for additional appropriations to intensify efforts in Vietnam. Congressional leaders have given you their backing. Even the media has played a consensus-building role by picturing Vietnam as this administration sees it: as part of the Cold War struggle.

s asked for more troops. After McNamara was sent in July to assess the situation in Saigon, he returned with the request to raise the American presence from 75,000 to 175,000 with a possible 100,000 more to follow. Does this sound like the promises you have made to the American public? The goals of your administration, the Gr

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Approximate Word count = 1453
Approximate Pages = 6 (250 words per page double spaced)

Category: Politics