How intergovernmental are the intergovernmental institutions of the EU?
The European Union has evolved over the years, since its foundation in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), into a unique set of institutions. The EU system now includes both supranational, intergovernmental and infranational forms of governance. As there are three forms of 'governance' in the system of the European Union, it needs to be determined whether individual institutions of the EU are subject to a blend of the supranational, intergovernmental and infranational forms of governance or whether each institution is predominantly intergovernmental, supranational or infranational. For this study, I will be focussing on the institutions considered to be intergovernmental, the key intergovernmental institutions being: The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) But what is intergovernmentalism? The International Law Dictionary states that an intergovernmental organisation is a "permanent organisation set up by two or more states to carry on activities of common interest". Meanwhile, Nugent states that intergovernmentalism implies that: "The institution, actor or process is dominated by the national governments of the mem
Despite CFSP being decided by intergovernmental institutions, the Council still retains an element of supranationalism in that actions, decisions and common positions are adopted through qmv. However, if a member of the Council wishes to oppose (not abstain) from these decisions as they believe it is important to their national policies, the Council can appeal to the European Council which resolves the issue on the basis of unanimity. Nevertheless, although not always the case, the importance of reaching a unanimous agreement in the Council is still commonplace in that the Council still prefers to reach a general consensus amongst the member states, favoring to bargain with the opposing member state(s), delay the legislation or alter the legislation than to out-vote and potentially isolate a member state. Indeed the Council will often resort to bargaining with the opposing Member State rather than begrudging it, even when it is entitled to proceed using qmv. Indeed, although qmv became an official process in deciding upon and adopting the majority of European legislation since the Single European Act in 1986, up until 1998 it had only been used once; in the meetings of December 1992 and February 1993, over the issues of the 'Banana Trade Regime' (which restricted the imports of bananas from outside the EU) and the Italian milk quota . The production of legislation is a joint activity, involving mainly the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament and, therefore, all legislation has some supranational element. The very nature of the European Union legislative process means that proposals can take four 'routes' to become legislation. These procedures are the co-decision, consultation, co-operation and assent procedures. Depending on which route is taken the legislation can be seen to have a more or less supranational or intergovernmental slant, and therefore the Council can be said as being more intergovernmental in certain policy areas than others. For example, when the proposal is to take the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament's powers are greatly increased, with the parliament having a potential veto and the ability for legislation to be passed by the Council through qmv instead of unanimity is much greater. Therefore, whilst the Council is the intergovernmental balance, it has to adapt and allow supranational considerations. On the other hand, the consultation procedure is a much more simple process, where the Council holds the key legislative power. The European Parliament only gives its opinion on legislation and its powers are limited to delaying the legislative process. In this instance, any legislation using the consultation procedure can be said to have a greater intergovernmental slant, and the Council, in so far as the consultation procedure is concerned, is a much more intergovernmental institution. Until Maastricht, there had not been a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Indeed, for almost forty years the expression 'Common Foreign Policy' was seen as somewhat taboo. To this extent, it is not surprising that this pillar is heavily intergovernmental - member governments are not willing to give up their sovereign rights to an supranational institution, such the Commission, that could potentially act above and beyond their own national interests. Due to the "sensitive nature of the affect CFSP could potentially have to international relations" , the roles of the European Commission, European Court of Justice (the main exponents of supranationalism) as well as the European Parliament, have been extremely limited for that very reason. It is the intergovernmental institutions, those that are designed to guard the national interest, that are the major decision-makers for CFSP. It is principally the European Council that makes the decisions in the CFSP, and it "occupies a position of the highest rank in the common foreign and security policy in that it d
Some common words found in the essay are:
European Union, Council Ministers, B-items A-items, European Parliament, Ulrich Haltern, Luxembourg Compromise, European Council, Treaty Paris, January Commission, European Parliament's, european union, council ministers, european parliament, intergovernmental institutions, european council, foreign security policy, security policy, ec pillar, legislative process, luxembourg compromise, supranational intergovernmental, common foreign security, 1999 macmillan press, luxembourg compromise 1966, union 1999 macmillan,
Approximate Word count = 2651
Approximate Pages = 11 (250 words per page double spaced)
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