In 1943 President Roosevelt suggested that Indochina come under the control of four powers after the war, proposing that the eventual independence of the Indochinese might follow in twenty to thirty years time. No one knew whether the policy would require American troops, but America was firm on the fact that independence could not be taken by the Vietnamese, but would be granted to the Vietnamese by the Great Powers at their convenience.

At the Yalta conference Roosevelt repeated his desire for a trusteeship but during March 1945 he considered the possibility of French restoration in return for their promise that independence would eventually occur. At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the issue of Indochina was resolved by authorizing the British takeover of the nation south of the 16th parallel and Chinese occupation north of it. This meant that the French, whom the British had supported since 1943, would return. This effectively made the USA responsible for the French reoccupation. USA's support for the French return to Indochina was logical, as this provided a way to stop the Communists from advancing in the East. By mid-August Frenc

1947-1950: United States inaction

The political character of the regime in Vietnam was less consequential than the larger United States design for the area, and the seeds of future United States policy were already forecast when Bruce suggested that '... the Indochinese - and I am speaking now of the... anti-Communist group - will have to show a far greater ability to live up to the obligations of nationhood before it will be safe to withdraw, whether it be French Union forces or any other foreign forces, from that country'. (5) If the French left, someone would have to replace them.

The total military aid to France in the 1950-53 period was $2,956 million, plus $684 million in 1954. The United States suggest that $1.54 billion in aid was given to Indochina before the Geneva Accords, and in fact Truman's statement in January 1953 that the United States paid for as much as half of the war is accurate.

Given the American idea of the importance Vietnam, which impelled the United States to support it financially, the future of the war no longer depended on whether the French would fight or meet the demands of the Vietnamese for independence. The war, even by 1952, was becoming internationalized, with America exercising her strength for its control. When Eisenhower came to the Presidency in January 1953 the United States government was aware of the French role in its global strategy, and it was believed in Congress that if the French pulled out, the US would not permit Vietnam to fall. The French were divided on the response the American intervention into the war required. In September the United States agreed to give the French a grant of $385 million to begin the 'Navarre Plan', a plan devised to destroy the Viet Minh forces by 1955. The problem the United States faced was how to apply its military power in a way that would avoid a land war in the jungles, one that Dulles always opposed in Asia. Given the regional, even global, context of Vietnam for the United States, a peaceful settlement would have undone all that Washington had tried to achieve since 1947. There was no effective means for a US entry into the war, and such power as the

Some common words found in the essay are:
Vietnam United, Chi Minh, French Union, Viet Minh, National Defence, French British, President Roosevelt, Vietnam French, Vietnamese Powers, Conference July, viet minh, vietnam united, french return indochina, american intervention, 1953 united, victory vietnam, land war, january 1953, french return, agreed french, ho chi minh, january 1953 united, chi minh,
Approximate Word count = 1478
Approximate Pages = 6 (250 words per page double spaced)