After World War I Germany limped back, licking its wounds that the Treaty of Versailles had so mercilessly rubbed in salt. As one looks back on the events leading up to World War II it has to be asked whether France and England helped to start World War II by their actions at Versailles. It seems that the revenge that the Allies took at the Treaty came back to haunt them with the aggression of Hitler in 1936. However, we can not blame Neville Chamberlain for something with which he had no part. Chamberlain's actions in the years 1936 to 1939 are enough to help one appreciate the dilemma he found himself in. Chamberlain did not, in the beginning, realise exactly what Hitler was after. Hitler was after vengeance for Germany because of the Treaty of Versailles, but Chamberlain did not realise that Hitler was after domination of Europe. When confronted about Germany's plan to attack Czechoslovakia Chamberlain responded, "I think it would be wrong to assume that the German government has any intention of doing such." The eyes of the world were on Chamberlain's every move, criticising, praising, and waiting. With the pressure of the world o

At home, Britain faced public protest over the failure to help Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Chamberlain justified it by pointing out the disunity between Czechs and Slovaks and the possibility that Czechoslovakia would break up anyhow. Then Chamberlain made a grand diplomatic gesture in March 1939 as he gave a guarantee to Poland of military protection if Germany attacked. The British-French alliance pledged to aide Poland with all available power "...in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces." Calvocoressi and Wint point out that this is a reversal of British Foreign Policy. For twenty years she had avoided accepting responsibility for stability in Eastern Europe, but she was now accepting it. Appeasement was backfiring, as Chamberlain was getting in deep over his head and ended up having to defend Poland, which he had never been prepared to do. Britain would need the help of the USSR - Poland's eastern neighbour - to make the guarantee effective. So, Britain and France negotiated with Stalin throughout the summer of 1939 - four months of complicated diplomatic manoeuvres. Chamberlain wanted to present Hitler with a solid diplomatic front against him. But he really distrusted the USSR and had not much confidence in her military strength. Stalin played along as he wanted time and space. Eventually he opted for the pact with Germany as the best way of protecting his own interests. So this element of British foreign policy was gone. In fact the failure of the policy of appeasement to prevent war was shameful in that it was actually a cause of World War II.

n his shoulders Chamberlain proceeded cautiously not wanting the tensions to explode. Historically, Britain had followed a foreign policy of appeasement and not getting involved with the rest of Europe. Thus in the 1920s, Britain appeased Weimar Germany with the aim of achieving justice, and paid the price of reducing reparations and treating Germany as an equal. In the 1930s Britain appeased Hitler's Germany with the aim of security and paying the price of turning a blind eye to Germany's ambitions. This essay shall offer analysis on Chamberlain's personal reasons to follow appeasement, the reasons on behalf of Britain and the reasons due to the views of the British public. A description of the course of appeasement will be given, and arguments for and against Chamberlain's use of appeasement against Hitler will be given. Thus the question as to "why did the British government follow a policy of appeasement in the 1930s" will be addressed and evidence will be given as to whether or not this policy was effective in achieving its aim.

 Fuchser, L.W. Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the

We can question the wisdom of Britain's actions, but there is no way of saying definitely that any other course of action would certainly have been better. The League of Nations had failed to restrain Hitler - it was powerless against any of its members who really wanted to break the rules. Britain was in a somewhat similar situation. She made mistakes but also bought time in 1938-1939 which she used to rearm (the problem was that this also gave Hitler time). Basically, Britain's leaders were deeply anxious to avoid war and so were rel

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Approximate Word count = 2276
Approximate Pages = 9 (250 words per page double spaced)