f containment. What we must remember under Kennen's containment is that nuclear diplomacy is not separate from other national security measures as it is often today. Nuclear weapons were part of an integrated system of containment and deterence. Truman told Kennen in early 1947 that "our weapons of mass destuction are not fail-safe devices, but instead the fundemental bedrock of American security" (Gaddis 56). They were never intended as first strike weapons and had no real tactial value. The bomb is purely strategic, and its value comes not from its destructive capabilties, but from its political and psychological ramifications. Kennen was never naive enough to view the bomb as an offensive weapon. In his long memorandum "The International Control of Atomic Energy," Kennen noted that "there could be no way in which weapons of mass destuction could be made to serve rational ends beyond simply deterring the outbreak of hostilities" (Kennen 39). Even at this early point, Kennen began to also recognize the potential of the bomb to completely wreck balance of power arrangments. Simply achieving higher potentials of destruction would not necessiarily lead to a better negotioating position with the Soviets. Truman had never considered not creating the hydrogen bomb, despite Kennen's objections. Truman's justified his adamant support of the super bomb for bargaining purposes with the Russians. Kennen's point, of course, had been that the very decision to build the hydrogen bomb would inhibit bargaining with the Russians on international control, since the Kremlin was unlikely to negotiate from a position of weakness. Most of the American national security structure viewed this as fallacious. Truman's preception was that the United States, as a technology rich but man power short nation, was operating from a position of weakness, since of necessity is relied more heavily than did the Soviet Union on weapons of mass destruction to maintain the balance of power. The Soviet atomic test in 1949 had upset that balance. Only by building the super bomb, it was thought, could equilibrium be regained. It would not be until the Kennedy administration that Kennen would be vindicated and an awareness would develop "of the basic unsoundness of a defense posture based primarily on weapons indiscriminately destructive and suicidal in their implications" (Kennen 365). The late mistakes of the Truman administration would be carryed over into the Eisenhower years. Nuclear deployment became the primary American security measure, naturally leading the Soviets to do the same. The problems of the Eisenhower years stemmed directly from the overconfidence in the U.S. nuclear program to achieve tangible military objectives in the face of increased hostilities. John Foster Dulles, the symbol of bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy, began to advocate the nuclear response. The impotence of our standing army compared to the Soviet's military behemoth was clear to all U.S. policy advisors. There was no way in which we could match Russia gun for gun, tank for tank, at anytime, in any place. John's brother Allen Dulles, CIA director under Eisenhower,

Some common words found in the essay are:
Nixon Kissenger, Kennen Kissenger, Planning Council, Henry Kissenger, Soviet Affairs, Eisenhower Instead, Vietnam Whatever, Johnson Vietnam, JF Dulles', Soviet Union, nuclear weapons, national security, flexible response, weapons mass, security policy, atomic bomb, american security, balance power, nuclear diplomacy, post-war national security, international relations, weapons mass destuction, weapons mass destruction, national security policy,
Approximate Word count = 2115
Approximate Pages = 8 (250 words per page double spaced)