Philosophical Behaviorism
1. Philosophical behaviorism states that all facts about minds and mental states are facts about bodily behavior, and behavioral dispositions. Behaviorism is a form of materialism because behavioral facts are physical facts. A behaviorist would agree with the claim that "mental states are what cause people to behave in the way they do, and to be disposed to behave in certain ways under certain conditions." This is because the behaviorist believes that these mental states can in principal be translated into behavioral situations. The Linguistic Thesis of Behaviorism declares that statements about mental states are equivalent in meaning to statements about behavior and behavioral dispositions. This is the behaviorists attempt to attribute a mental state to a person. This however is only an attempt because there are two problems with that statement. Firstly, it evidently ignored, and even denied, the 'inner aspect' of our mental states. For example, to have a pain, is no!t just a matter of being inclined to moan and wince, say, "I have a headache," and so on. Pains also have an intrinsic qualitative nature that is revealed in introspection. There can not be a theory on mind that denies such qualia. T
in English and is able to respond because he knows English. He has also gotten very good at manipulating the Chinese symbols. Now, no one would be able to tell that he does not know a word of Chinese when he gives back the answers. His answers are indistinguishable from those of a native speaker. Also, when he is given stories in English, his answers are indistinguishable from those of a native speaker because he himself is a native speaker. In both cases his answers seem to be equally good, but in the case of the Chinese answers, he produced answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. Therefore, in the case of the Chinese, he acted like a computer; "I am simply an instantiation of the computer program" (Searle 71). The point or Searle's Chinese room example is to show that even though a computer can pass the Turing test, a computer is not an intelligent creature with understanding an comprehension. When Searle manipulates the Chinese symbols, he gives the sa! Turing test creates a situation in which an intelligent creature communicates with another intelligent creature and something else (X). These two things are given the same input and both output the same response. This means that the two are indistinguishable, and X passes the test that means that X is an intelligent creature with understanding and comprehension. Computers actually can pass this test. The Chinese room experiment creates a situation where Searle is locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. He does not know that this is Chinese writing, to him it is a bunch of squiggles. Then he is given a second batch of writing with a set of rules relating it to the first batch. These rules are in English and can be understood because he knows English. He can identify all of the symbols by their shapes. Now he is given a third batch of symbols in English that allow him to correlate this third batch with the first two. He learns how to give back cert! ectly. Basically, all types of non-human beings can have human software. Functionalism says that mental states are functional states that are definable in terms of their typical causes (inputs) and their typi
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Approximate Word count = 1467
Approximate Pages = 6 (250 words per page double spaced)
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