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“Democracy Restrained: The Great Threat of the Constitution”

The fundamental point of contention between the Federalists and anti-Federalists in their debates over ratification of the Constitution surrounded the question of what powers were necessary in order to insure the security of the nation as a whole. The federalists, of course, believed that a strong central government was necessary, for reasons of national security and economic prosperity. The anti-Federalists were strongly opposed to the centralization of power, rather, they were concerned with retaining the sovereignty of the states and, in turn, their secured political freedom. Three issues were the cause of great apprehension to the anti-Federalists upon reading the proposed Constitution – the size of the new nation, the problem of political representation and the disconcerting concentration of governmental powers. In interpreting the Constitution, the anti-Federalists believed that because of these key issues and how they were dealt with in the new government, the!

ir freedom was seriously at risk. Their fear and distrust of the new government was focused on the relatively few individuals who, under the new government, would hold the political

its structure and in its underlying principles.

If the great republics of the world could not maintain the freedom of its citizens while expanding their territories, why should America be any different? This view is supported Monesquieu, as Brutus cites: “In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen (Kammen 308).” Moving from his historical examples and looking to the “nature of things” surrounding extensive republics, Brutus argues, “In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign…for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent (Kammen 309).” Although a pure democracy was not a practical option for such a large nation, the argument for a democratic form of government in terms of representation and consent !

History. New York: Penguin Books Inc., 1986.

assion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression (Kammen 149).” Madison further discusses his theory, stating, “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens (Kammen 151).” The natural result of expansion (and this was clear to Madison) was the weakening of the power of the majority and, most importantly, the deterioration of political representation. What the Constitution created was a political order that made it difficult for people to come together through common interests by making communication and concerted action difficult. Madison’s and other founder’s fear of the majority manifested itself in the limiting of the people’s political power in a calculated and underhanded way.

Madison’s philosophy of how to secure and maintain power in a large republic adds support to the anti-Federalists arguments and fears surrounding the undemocratic nature of the Constitution. Madison was a vigorous opponent of pure democracy who feared that the uneducated masses would tyrannize the minority (a minority of which he was included) with their majority rule if given any significant amount of democratic powers. In his Federalist No.10, Madison describes the “dangerous vice” of political factions resulting from a government terrorized by an over-bearing majority (Kammen 145). Although Madison points out that he does not support the taking of liberty, he nonetheless agrees that, “Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire (Kammen 146).” Madison’s theory was that through uniting the states under a strong central government, the power of destructive political factions would be limited: “the majority, having such co-existent p!

eed not pass through the will and consent of the people. In addition, other powers given to Congress in Article I, section 8, including the sole ability to tax, declare war (as well as form a standing army) and print money, demonstrated to the anti-Federalists how subservient they were to the powers of the new government. Whatever power individuals once possessed under their state governments was to be wrested from them as per Article I, section 10 which stated that no state could enact certain laws without the consent of Congress.

To the opponents of the Constitution, many warning signs of potential despotism were visible in the proposed government – the sole power of taxation, the lack of protection of freedoms, the formation of a large military force, the dissolving of states’ powers, and above all, the concentration of powers in the hands of a few. It is this last issue that seemed to be of greates

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Approximate Word count = 3118
Approximate Pages = 12 (250 words per page double spaced)

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