United States Government Printing Office

The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, chaired by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, investigated the circumstances surrounding the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger shortly after liftoff on January 28, 1986. The Commission was established in February, 1986, pursuant to Executive Order 12546, and it issued its final report in June, 1986. William Rogers was at the time a practicing attorney and senior partner in the law firm Rogers & Wells. In 1973, Rogers was awarded the Medal of Freedom. All other members of the Commission have excellent qualifications such as previous spacecraft commander, engineers, director of Space Systems and Command, Control, Communication, astronauts, and physicists.

January 28th, 1986, was the coldest day that NASA had ever attempted to launch a manned spacecraft; at 36 degrees Fahrenheit, it was 15 degrees colder than any previous launch temperature. Although lift-off time for the Challenger flight 51-L had been delayed twice that morning, all operations and systems seemed to

At 0.68 seconds after ignition, videotape showed black smoke coming from the bottom field joint of the right solid rocket booster (SRB). The SRB comes in four segments that are assembled. The bottom field joint is the lowest joint on the SRB. The black smoke suggested that grease, joint insulation, and rubber O-rings were being burned. The smoke continued to come from the bottom field joint facing the exterior tank in cycles of three puffs of smoke per second. The last puff of smoke was seen at 2.7 seconds. The black smoke was an indication that the bottom field joint was not sealing correctly. At 58.8 seconds into flight, on enhanced film, a flame was seen coming from the right SRB. The flame was coming from the underside of the bottom joint. It was burning gas that was escaping from the SRB. A fraction of a second later, at 59.3 seconds, the flame was well defined and could be seen without enhanced film.

The Rogers Commission later found that executives of Morton Thiokol were in agreement with the lower level research engineers until they found out that NASA was considering other companies to build the rocket boosters. Not wanting to lose their biggest client, Thiokol heads changed their minds a few days before the 28th to act in the "best interests" of the firm--to go a head with the launch. This provided an even tougher challenge for Boisjoly and company to change anyone's mind on the launch eve. He later stated, "This was a meeting where the determination was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position usually is in a preflight conversation or a flight readiness review." The engineers were ignored. No one went to the press or a member of Congress. No one tried to reach the astronauts and inform them of the risks they were taking if they launched the following morning. High-level engineers told NASA what it wanted to hear, and low-level engineers held their breath and went back to work.

The solid rocket booster's segments are joined together by a tang and clevis joint. Each segment has a tang on the bottom and a clevis on top. The clevis is the female connector, while the tang is the male linking component. The bottom-mid segment connects to the bottom segment with a nozzle. Where this occurs is called the bottom field joint. There are two "washers" called O-rings that wrap around the clevis and seal the joint, as well as a zinc chromate putty that is stuck in the joint. The bottom field joint is the joint that failed on the right solid rocket booster. There were a few causes that could have led to the joint seal failure: 1) Damage or contamination could have occurred during the assembly. 2) The gap between the joints had grown as a result of prior use of the solid rocket motors. 3) The temperature on the day of the launch was 36 degrees; the temperature of the bottom right field joint was 28 degrees at launch time. 4) The performance of the putty that was applied to the joint. 5) Overall construction of field joints made by Morton Thiokol (the company that produced the SRBs for NASA).

Six days later, President Reagan, who was moved and troubled by the horrible accident of mission 51-L, appointed an independent commission made up of persons not connected with the mission to investigate it. The purpose of the commission was to: "1) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident; and 2) Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the commission's findings and determinations." Other selected persons in addition to Chairman Rogers were Vice-Chairman, Neil Armstrong, a previous NASA astronaut and federal employee, and astronaut Sally Ride. The remainder of the commission were David Acheson, Eugene Covert, Richard Feyman (Nobel Prize physicist whose contributions would be critical), Robert Hotz, Donald Kutyna, Robert Rummel, Joseph Sutter,

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Approximate Word count = 2787
Approximate Pages = 11 (250 words per page double spaced)