ratives." What he used instead was an abundance of accounts written in Russian that had previously been neglected. His hope was to use these materials to display the war from "new or long

e who saw a war as desirable. Following these failed negotiations was a declaration made by the Japanese that they would defend their "menaced position" and protect their rights. In other words, they would fight the Russians.

Lieven, D.C.B. 1989. History: The Journal of the Historical Association. 74(240): 168.

This book should be read by anyone who has little knowledge of the Russo-Japanese war and is interested in any facet of its happenings. I would also say that this book should be read as the first secondary-source for any researcher of the Russo-Japanese war, and kept in mind throughout his/her research. In spite of my recommendation, I would venture to guess that this book would not be useful to someone who already has the presumption that the Russians were simply incompetent and deserved to lose as a result. However, since the book does point out much of the Russian incompetence, it is also possible that many of these presumptuous readers would only focus in on such parts, using them as further evidence to support their claims.

dely believed that this war would provide a glimpse to the wars of the future.

J.N. Westwood is an extremely qualified writer of such a book. Not only is he currently (1986-?) an Honorary Research Fellow in the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (Univ. of Birmingham), but he has also been a naval correspondent (Birmingham Post), served in the Intelligence Corps, and has held several college-level professorial positions (McGill, Florida State, U of Sydney). This is not to say by any means that he would have the ability to write flawlessly, but he does his best with this book. As I read the preface, in which Westwood claims that he is going to try to examine the Russo-Japanese fairly by looking at neglected Russian works and long-forgotten angles of interpretation, I already thought that I had found a gem of a book. Finally, someone who is willing to oppose what others have said in the past or what has become "anecdotal," and instead attempt to shed new light on the issue at hand. This view was only strengthened as I completed the book. I !

Still in the first chapter, Westwood delves into the negotiations setup by President Theodore Roosevelt in hopes of a peaceful resolution, although as I read, I realized that they could have been summarized in one word...deadlock. However, in his historical analysis of the work, Westwood sees fit to mention them without hesitation, rightly so I should add. In his discussion of the negotiations, the main point is made that each side was unwilling, almost completely, to concede anything to the other. This was mainly because, although a war was clearly not the euphoric solution, Russians were not frightened by the "puny yellow" Japanese and the Japanese saw themselves as invincible. In concordance, since Russian presence in Manchuria and their objective to obtain Korea as well were national security issues for the Japanese and the Russians had no intentions to rescind these plans, many high-ranking officials on both sides saw a war as inevitable. In fact, there were even thos!

at is machine guns and field guns, Westwood gave the edge to the Russians. With regards to the navy, however, the Russians and the Japanese were about even in strength. The problem with the Japanese Navy at the beginning of the war was that it was not to gain any new ships for the duration of the conflict. This was because the Japanese had no ship-building, even having to acquire extra ships before the war in order to compensate for the larger Russian Navy. However, the Russians were not exempt from naval problems either. Their main problem was that their navy was split three ways, in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the East, and with this split, they were obviously not full strength. Westwood notes that this would not have been a serious problem had it not been for the fact that laws of neutrality during

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