Brazil's Conflict
Brazil's transformation from an authoritarian regime to a presidential democracy was a slow and faltered attempt. From the early suggestions of democratic development, there were both administrations that contributed to democratic growth, as well as administrations that opposed this liberalization. This led to instability in the Brazilian form of democratic government, their economy, and their political parties. The people's reactions to these instabilities confirm the fact that the Brazilian democratic regime was not working effectively. Although Brazil was governed under a democratic system because the president was chosen by the people, the president rarely acted in a democratic manner. The first signs of a modern democratic government in Brazil appeared in 1945 when the military deposed President Getúlio Vargas. Vargas had created an authoritarian regime (the Estado Nôvo) based largely on the military. Once Vargas had been removed from power, Brazil instituted a competitive multi-party system. Multi-party systems are not a requirement for democracy, but democratization has been associated with the development of parties. This step towards a true democratic government was negated in 1964 when the military forced a reversion
Censorship of the media was re-implemented by Geisel. In remembering the past, the Geisel administration recalled the MDB upset victories in the 1974 elections. Soon after, the government pushed a bill known as the "Falcão Law" through Congress, which severely limited radio and television involvement in the 1976 municipal elections. The Geisel government resorted to these measures when they realized the possibility of MDB victories in the upcoming elections. However, even with these strict media regulations, the MDB still managed victories in the larger urban areas. In conclusion, the Brazilian presidential democracy was not a legitimate one. Most of the general-presidents used the "winner take all" approach and ruled in a dictatorial manner. The president committed authoritarian acts that were widely protested among the people. Furthermore, these government did not represent a true continual dual legitimacy between the executive and legislature. Perhaps most importantly was the fact that the people did not actually choose the president. Since the government's main concern seemed to be retaining their party1s power, they kept the people from making a real difference in choosing the president. These circumstances collectively confirm the fact that the Brazilian government was far from a true democratic presidential regime. In late 1978, Geisel held true on his promise of phasing out some of the authoritarian aspects of government. The Congress passed the reforms that Geisel had proposed in September; the most important reform being the repeal of the Fifth Institutional Amendment. However, the MDB boycotted the final vote because they said that the proposal did not go far enough. This may have been because "new 'safeguard1 powers were given to the executive, including authority to declare a limited state of emergency without Congressional approval."22 In his first year in office, Figueiredo reorganized the political party system. Figueiredo decided to implement a multi-party system which he hope would help ARENA in future elections by either splitting the opposition vote or by forming a coalition with some of the more conservative parties. Another part to the new party system included changing the names of the existing parties and the restriction that no party could use the word "party" in their new name. ARENA then became Partido Democratico Social (PDS) and MDB became the Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB). The MDB trick of preserving its name in recognition irritated the government. Also, many new parties were borne out of this new system, which is exactly what Figueiredo was hoping for. Castelo Branco managed to hold the hardliners demands at bay with the enactment of concessions. To make his successor's transition to office easier, Castelo Branco and his advisers reformed the constitution so that the next president could assume power in a "normal" constitutional regime. The fear of discontinuity in policies and distrust of a potential successor encourages a sense of urgency, ...that might lead to ill-designed policies, rapid implementation, impatience with the opposition, and expenditures that otherwise would be distributed over a longer period of time or policies that might contribute to political tension and sometimes inefficiency. 35 Geisel expressed his hope for a gradual redemocratization, beginning with distensão (decompression), although he also warned that national security was indispensable to ensure development. Before Geisel could begin any form of redemocratization, he needed support from the officer corps. Hard-liners could be expected to oppose or even sabotage any attempt at liberalization. Just before the elections of 1982 were scheduled to take place, the government created the "November Package" and pass it through Congress. This prohibited electoral coalitions and also required voters to vote a straight ticket in hopes that the PDS would benefit. Even closer to election
Some common words found in the essay are:
November Package, House MDB, April Package, Francisco Pinto, Brazil Presidentialism, Brazil Brazil, Chamber Deputies, Security Law, , Congressman MDB, officer corps, fifth institutional amendment, presidential democracy, institutional amendment, costa silva, fifth institutional, security forces, economic growth, national security, true democratic, dual legitimacy, army officer corps, continued economic growth,
Approximate Word count = 3057
Approximate Pages = 12 (250 words per page double spaced)
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