During the years of 1940 and 1941, the war in Europe caused much concern for Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. The longer the war dragged on, the greater their concern grew. With the United States claiming neutrality, Britain and its Royal Navy could not hold off Hitler's army for much longer. There seemed to be nothing the United States could do but to help out in any way it could to keep Britain from being defeated by the Germans. Roosevelt knew that something needed to be done, and it needed to be done quickly

Back home in the United States, Roosevelt had problems of his own. The American people did not want war. They did not concern themselves with what was going on oversees, mainly because some of them had no idea of it. As for the ones who did, they still did not want to be involved in this huge war that was going on so far away from the American shores. Roosevelt had even gone so far as to promise the American people that with himself in office, there would be no war (unless of course the United States was attacked).

To reemphasize the importance of the codes, the author described in detail some specific messages that were intercepted by the Americans during this time of war. Most likely the most important of the messages that were intercepted by Magic (the codename for the code-breaking ability), was the fourteen part message that was part of the direct line of events that led to Pearl Harbor. Though in the message an exact time was recorded as to when the attack was to take place, the Japanese so much as said that they were up to some sort of revenge against the United States for not accepting the proposed modus vivendi. This was not overlooked as though it may seem that way. What was overlooked however, was that the Japanese would send three-fourths of its entire aircraft-carrier force all the way to Pearl Harbor for an insatiable attack (p. 41).

4. Describe Beach's criticism of Washington's withholding of key intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and General Short hours before Pearl Harbor was attacked.

The fourth responsibility that Marshall failed to meet was a more generalized one. During the entire period of November 27 and December 7, General Marshall failed to investigate the readiness of the Pacific Fleet, knowing that there would be a possibility of war striking there.

The second was in regard to General Marshall's disregard to Short of an inquiry regarding more information on his misunderstanding of a previous message that indicated a possibility of war.

The result that he received from the United States was quite a different one in 1941. Rather than hurting the morale of the Americans, it greatly boosted it. When he realized the reaction that the United States had to his attack, he immediately realized that he was in deeper than he could swim. Two statements of his after the attacks can easily summarize the thought process he went through. The first came directly after the attack, "I fear we have roused a sleeping giant" (p. 83). The second came later but had an equally lasting effect to it, "[To win this war now] we'll have to dictate peace on the steps of the White House!" (p. 83). It was obvious to anyone that he knew he had made a critical mistake, and he was going to pay the penalty for it.

Yamamoto seemed to know from the beginning that the United States was not an enemy to be taken lightly. He knew that if there were to be a conflict between the two nations of Japan and the United States, that the United States would most likely win the battle with little difficulty. As the author puts it, Yamamoto "correctly appreciated America's tremendous industrial potential, almost light-years ahead of Japan's," (p. 82).

Second Investigation: The Roberts Commission

The United States did a great job of making sure that they did not directly react to any of the important messages they intercepted. The knowledge from the messages was greatly important, but it must not be used in any way to tip off the Japanese that their code had been broken. As the question stated, the intelligence was confidential. It was not only confidential to the Japanese as they received them but also to the Americans who received them unbeknownst to the Japanese.

Yamamoto, however, knowing that through the strategies that were taking place in Japan's conquering attempt of China, a conflict with the United States was inevitable down the road. Knowing this, he knew that he had to come up with a strategy that would hold back the United States for as long as possible. This is what led to his biggest mistake and misconception. He felt that if he could take out the United State's Pacific Fleet, that he could accomplish his goal, which was again to hold the American's back, not necessarily to defeat them. He felt like a great enough attack would "scare" the Americans into letting Japan fight with China. He succeeded part of his plan. He certainly took out America's Pacific Fleet, but the part that was unexpected was th

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