Karl Popper can be credited with positing an alternative, original methodology of science that escapes, it would appear, many of the Humean problems to induction. What follows is a careful examination of the falsificationist philosophy where it shall be shown that falsificationism is not as coherent a philosophy as one might think, and that the objection in the form of the Quine-Duhem thesis renders Popper's position deeply precarious with few escape routes. The relation of observation experiences to language shall take a key place in this essay for it is here more than anywhere else that the debate shall be decided. The argument between realism and anti-realism shall not be gone into too deeply but, for the purpose of this essay, an anti-realist idea of science shall be presupposed in the sense that it will be taken that scientific knowledge is derived from factual statements and not from "things in themselves". It shall be concluded that if scientific knowledge cannot transcend and escape the language or concepts that are employed in expressing it then the Quine-Du

Initially we started of outlining Popper's falsificationist philosophy. It was emphasized and hopefully made abundantly clear that because science has to operate in a conceptual scheme it cannot isolate one theory from that scheme but must take into account the rest of the scheme. If this is accepted the Quine-Duhem thesis does and cannot fail in invalidating the falsificationism of the sort that a single observance can falsify a universal law or theory because single theories have no meaning by themselves but only in relation to the whole scheme of knowledge. It should also be clear though, that a different type of falsificationism can be applied to scientific knowledge, that contradictory observance has an effect on some part of the field and results in change but not necessarily on the part that it is been claimed it refutes. The Quine-Duhem thesis may have refuted Popper but a version of falsificationism can be seen to have survived. Finally it was argued against holism that it would lead to relativism and proposed that holism eventually will evolve to become an absolute account of the world.

One striking similarity between Popper and Quine is that they were both fallibilists, i.e. they both argued against the absolute truth of scientific theories, theories were for Popper guesses or bold conjectures awaiting refutation. Popper took seriously Hume's skepticism of induction and agreed that induction could not justify scientific knowledge; by adopting his falsificationist philosophy he claimed he had escaped the problem. The problem of induction simply put is that one cannot infer infallibly from a particular to a universal and that you cannot use a particular to justify a universal claim.

P2 Particular instance "This X is not Y"

Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 3006
Approximate Pages = 12 (250 words per page double spaced)