Quine-duhem thesis and Popper

Karl Popper can be credited with positing an alternative, original methodology of science that escapes, it would appear, many of the Humean problems to induction. What follows is a careful examination of the falsificationist philosophy where it shall be shown that falsificationism is not as coherent a philosophy as one might think, and that the objection in the form of the Quine-Duhem thesis renders Popper’s position deeply precarious with few escape routes. The relation of observation experiences to language shall take a key place in this essay for it is here more than anywhere else that the debate shall be decided. The argument between realism and anti-realism shall not be gone into too deeply but, for the purpose of this essay, an anti-realist idea of science shall be presupposed in the sense that it will be taken that scientific knowledge is derived from factual statements and not from “things in themselves”. It shall be concluded that if scientific knowledge cannot transcend and escape the language or concepts that are employed in expressing it then the Quine-Du

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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 3006
Approximate Pages = 12 (250 words per page double spaced)