Moral Truth in Emotivism and the Social Convention Theory
Ethical theory aspies to an articulation of the principles and motivations underlying our intuitive moral judgements. A sufficient theory must, therefore, account for the character of morality as we view it. We regard morality as aspiring to truth, and our intuition dictates that our moral judgements are at least sometimes true. We speak of morality as involving some degree of universality within the whole of humanity or within society. Philosopher Gilbert Harman presents emotivism as a potential theory and rejects it as an insufficient account of our sense of moral truth. He presents the social convention theory as a feasible alternative, but his proposal does not satisfy the criteria on which emotivism is rejected.Emotivism asserts that moral judgements express emotions, attitudes, feelings, favor, and values. They are expressions of, not about, approval or disapproval. For example, emotivism does not say that ?X is wrong? means ?I disapprove of X.? The first statement expresses disapproval. The second is about the speaker?s disapproval. Moral judgements, according to emotivism, are manifestations of emotion rather than expressions of cognitive states like beliefs. Emotivism accounts for the passion of moral respon
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Approximate Word count = 1585
Approximate Pages = 6 (250 words per page double spaced)
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