Minimum Sentences
The case of Robert Latimer, the Saskatchewan farmer who killed his disabled daughter Tracy, has once again brought into focus the issue of mandatory minimum sentences (MMS). Latimer was twice convicted of second degree murder for what he claimed was a compassionate killing. His case culminated in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on the grounds that the circumstances of the killing merited a constitutional exemption, under s.12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, from the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with ten years of parole ineligibility (Grant 2001). The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal that a life sentence, in his case, constituted cruel and unusual punishment on the basis that the planning and premeditation of the act, as well as his attempts at concealment and lack of remorse, overrode his dedication to Tracy and other mitigating factors. Unlike previous cases, the Latimer appeal did not challenge the constitutionality of the mandatory sentence for murder; only the applicability of this sentence to his case. Nevertheless, the case brought into full view the fundamental dilemma associated with MMS; namely, that their predictable quality, which is said to affo
Two commentators referred to mandatory minima as "the politician's criminal justice snake oil", suggesting that politicians champion these sentences to demonstrate that they are tough on crime (Doob and Cesaroni 2001). The efficacy of these sentences is secondary to their optics. These authors further note that mandatory penalties fail to afford the public added protection and have a corrupting influence on the justice system, as prosecutors and other justice system actors seek to circumvent them. Despite some positive findings, this sweeping, draconian law has not been shown to bring about a decisive reduction in violent crime. One reason for this is its excessive breadth. Eighty-five percent of those convicted under California's Three Strikes law have been nonviolent or drug offenders, thereby limiting its ability to prevent violent crime (Schultz 2000). Also, these laws have been applied to only a handful of individuals in most states, as prosecutors and even judges have circumvented them. As of August 1998, no more than six individuals had been sentenced in eight of the twenty-two states that had adopted Three Strikes laws (Schultz 2000). Furthermore, concerns have been raised about jury nullification; the refusal to convict defendants when the penalty is perceived to be too harsh (Harris and Jesilow 2000). Empirical evidence and cost effectiveness: Some illustrative cases From a utilitarian perspective, if longer mandatory sentences are to be imposed, they should be reserved for the most active offenders, because more crime will be prevented through their incapacitation and such offenders tend not to respond to the mere threat of sanctions or moral appeals (Gendreau, Andrews, Goggin, and Chanteloupe 1992; Gendreau, Goggin, and Cullen 1999; Spelman 1995). As selective incapacitation is not a realistic option, targeting more active offenders may take the form of higher thresholds at which longer sentences are triggered. Long prison sentences for first-time offenders provide a poor return on justice system expenditures. In this context, the mandatory life sentences in Canada for murder may serve retributive purposes, but they are excessive if optimization of expenditures is sought. Moreover, even with regard to the most active offenders, incarceration beyond a certain point offers diminishing returns as offenders tend to be less active in crime with age, while the cost of their care increases. Gun homicides and/or robberies have declined in several American jurisdictions following the introduction of firearm sentence enhancements (McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema 1992). The evidence was mixed on the impact of Massachusetts' Bartley-Fox Amendment, a law prescribing a one-year MMS for illegal gun carrying (Gabor and Crutcher 2001). Subject to intensive evaluation, this Amendment may have failed to meet expectations due to adaptive behaviour on the part of the police. For example, searches of suspects became more selective and guns were increasingly confiscated without charges (Tonry 1992). Projections following the enactment of California's Three Strikes law foresaw the need for an additional 20 prisons in the short-term alone, costing upwards of $5 billion (Owens 1995). Bales and Dees (1992) note that the creation of a large subpopulation of long-term offenders as a result of MMS may produce management problems for institutions, especially where these penalties limit the acquisition of "good-time" credits by inmates. These credits create incentives for cooperative behaviour. In addition, overcrowded institutions in California and elsewhere have resulted in the premature release of inmates not subject to MMS. In Los Angeles County jail, for example, inmates currently serve just 45% of their sentence to make room for defendants awaiting trial (Markel 1996). Shortening the sentences or accelerating releases of other offenders may increase public disapproval, one rationale for introducing MMS in the first place. A
Some common words found in the essay are:
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