The stage was set. The 450-man strong 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry commanded by LTC Harold G. Moore hit the ground at landing zone x-ray in the early morning hours of November 14, 1964. Before even half of the battalion could be dropped in, the landing zone was declared hot. Unbeknown to LTC Moore, his battalion had just dropped right in on top of two full regiments of the People's Army of Vietnam. The PAVN, commanded by Gen Chu Huy Man, was a full 2000-man strong and dug in on their home turf. Both LTC Moore and Gen Man had the same orders to "find and kill the enemy." LTC Moore was surrounded and greatly outnumbered, but Moore had several key advantages. Moore knew that decentralized operations and junior leader empowerment was essential to winning a battle and the events of LZ X-Ray and the "Lost Platoon" would prove Moore's doctrine correct.

LTC Moore believed adamantly that every trooper in his outfit should know the duty of the soldier above him and Moore instilled this idea in his men from the very beginning of his command at the change of command ceremony. At the ceremony Moore told his company commanders and battalion staff, "No fat troops or officer

So what should a young leader and future commissioned officer take from the story of the events of LZ-RAY and "The Lost Platoon?" The first and most important lesson one learns from the experience is that pre-planning and appropriate training is absolutely essential to a unit. LTC Moore, as any good leader would, knew this as well. Moore's training during the 14 months prior to his battalion's deployment to Vietnam played an essential role in the outcome of the battle of X-RAY. Moore's troopers knew exactly what to do and when to do it. Secondly, the junior leadership empowerment drills that Moore's troopers went over and over again while in training paid dividends for "The Lost Platoon."

LT Herrick ran hastily from soldier to soldier to organize a defense. As he did this, Herrick was shot and his last words were, "If I have to die, I am glad to give my life to my country"(102). Command of the platoon now passed "to Sergeant Carl Palmer to Sergeant Robert Stokes as, each in turn, died fighting"(106). Command of the Platoon now passed to buck sergeant Ernie Savage. Savage was not even the next in line in the chain of command but he was the closest to the radio so he assumed command. SGT Savage immediately got on the radio and began to call in indirect fire in an attempt to deter the Vietnamese who were coming on strong. Savage immediately established an effective ring of artillery steel. This ring of steel provided enough protection to the platoon that, as night fell on the "Lost Platoon" not another soldier would die during the long night that was to come. SGT Savage called in indirect fire with extraordinary accuracy through the night determined to "hold their ground till the end"(106). The next day the remaining men of "The Lost Platoon" were rescued.

At 8:50 a.m. on the morning 1-7 Cav was to mount their assault on LZ X-Ray COL Thomas W. Brown, the 3rd Brigade commander, pulled aside Moore and his S-3 CPT Ma

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Approximate Word count = 1310
Approximate Pages = 5 (250 words per page double spaced)