'The view is rapidly gaining currency that not only did Olivares' policies for Spain and its empire not differ markedly from those of earlier Spanish statesmen, but that by and large the results of his manifold endeavours were both few and modest.'

This understanding of the historiography of Olivares' effectiveness from Israel, makes Olivares look unoriginal and ineffectual. However other historians, such as Elliott have been far more sympathetic.

'...the first and the last ruler of Hapsburg Spain who had the breadth of vision to devise plans on a grand scale for the future of a world-wide monarchy: a statesman whose capacity for conceiving great designs was matched only by his consistent incapacity for carrying them through to a successful conclusion.'

Were Olivares' policies a realistic way out of Spain's difficulties or did they aggravate the situation? To understand this I am going to look at both Olivares' foreign policy and domestic policy. Within foreign policy I propose to see how far Olivares pushed the reputacion of the state before domestic crises forced him to seek peace. Among others the best are

as to examine would be Olivares' policies during the Thirty Years War from 1622; the Mantuan War 1628-31 and the great revolts of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640. As for domestic policy I will need to look at Olivares' initial reforms of 1623, why they fell through and the effect this had. Furthermore it is important to look at the areas where domestic policy coincides with foreign policy (in a defensive sense) in the Great Memorial, including the Union of Arms. I will also have to find out if Olivares' policies were consistent, or whether they became more and more drastic during his term of office. Firstly though, to understand if the policies were realistic or not, I will have to look into the real problems of Spain. Where exactly did these problems lie and what areas required alteration to keep Spain afloat? From this point I will go on to see the policies in action and from this I will gather whether or not they were realistic.

However all hope of peace was not lost, and in March 1637 Richelieu was willing to discuss conditions for peace. It is probable that this was not due to any Spanish influence, but because Richelieu was facing conspiracy and popular unrest. However the great distrust that emanated from both sides prevented any agreement, if anything they just wanted to disrupt each other's alliances. Richelieu wanted a treaty maintaining the status quo, while Olivares had great ambitions for the following year, making it very difficult to commit to anything. Again one can witness Olivares' overconfidence backfiring on him. Although Spain managed to thwart a French invasion into Catalonia; her military concentration was elsewhere and Frederick Henry inflicted a severe defeat by taking Breda in October 1637. Defeat would possibly have been avoidable if Olivares could have attained peace with at least one of his enemies, thus allowing him to concentrate on one target.

Taken out of context this may seem like an attempt to get rid of the privileges (jueors) held by the non-Castilian kingdoms. However it seems Olivares' intentions in this case were to have a mutual and integrated partnership with benefits for all the kingdoms. 'I am not nacional, that is something for children'. However action went in the opposite direction of intention; for example there was no effort to break the Castilian monopoly of offices, or to open up trade with the New World. His first step for unity was in the Union of Arms; a form of collective defence where a large army of 140 000 men would be supplied through a quota system from the constituent parts of the monarchy.

Since Richelieu was planning the emancipation of France from Hapsburg encirclement, there was heavy expenditure in Italy and further subsidies to the Emperor, whose territorial gains were being made worthless by the Swedes - a 'hired' force acting in France's interests. The financial crisis mounted in 1628, when there was a deficit of two million ducats in the year's provisions. However the most visible economic downturn came in September when Piet Heyn captured the New Spain treasure fleet; the first time that a treasure fleet had fallen into foreign hands. With the huge sum gained from this capture, the Dutch dropped any plans for peace and immediately embarked on an offensive. Frederick Henry, the Stadholder, whose army outmatched the Spanish Flanders army by two to one, made successful attacks both on Wesel in August (1629) and Bois-le-Duc in September. These attacks came at a time when Spain was concentrating on the Mantuan war, and due to the diversion of her resources, it seems that making a favourable peace with the Dutch was now out of the question. Therefore a new force headed by the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand was sent to settle the area and force a more favourable peace with the Dutch, following the death of the Archduchess Isabella in December 1633. For Olivares this was diplomacy by more forceful means. The Cortes had voted 4 million ducats for the campaign and b

Some common words found in the essay are:
Arms Olivares', Yearly Spain, Isabella December, Reformation February, Juntas Olivares, Unless Castile, November Corbie, Union Arms, Hapsburg Spain, Olivares Portuguese, union arms, favourable peace, olivares' policies, peace dutch, foreign policy, mantuan war, favourable peace dutch, spain war, domestic policy, arms olivares', 16 000, statesman capacity conceiving, union arms olivares', incapacity carrying successful, spain world power,
Approximate Word count = 4299
Approximate Pages = 17 (250 words per page double spaced)