He has another book, on the Franco-Prussian of 1870, in planning.

             Wawro builds his book chronologically, beginning with the Congress of Vienna in 1815. He describes the problems associated with the German people"s attempts to unify after the allied defeat of Napoleon. He then goes on to detail how Austria and Prussia both vied for supremacy in the confederation of German states. He focuses mainly on the direct confrontations between the two nations and the abilities of their leaders. Wawro appears almost to be a Germanophile as he fawns over the ingenious political strategies of Prussian Chancellor Bismarck, while constantly berating the sub-par performance of Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph. He also uses the beginning of the book to describe past Austrian domination in Italian affairs, and the animosity that was building between these two states. He reviews the history of Austrian interference in Italy that drove the Italians into a military alliance with Prussia, and eventually into the war. Although he is less enamored of Italy"s leaders, he still holds them above the Austrian leaders whom he portrays as foreign interlopers trying to prevent Italian unity as much as German. He moves through the months and years quickly, going from one crisis to the next until the three nations were on the brink of war, with Austria facing a double-edged sword, Italy in the south and Prussia in the north.

             The main force of the book is Wawro"s retelling of the war; planning, mobilization, and engagements. He uses a whole chapter to detail all three nation"s problems in organization and preparedness. He repeatedly praises the Prussians for their efficiency in mobilization of troops and superior strategy. Wawro humbles both the Austrians and Italians as he berates both nations" military state in supplies, manpower, technology, and strategy. He takes special interest in pointing out the ineptitude of Italian and Austrian generals and the political intrigue and maneuvering that got them their commands.