A philosophy of knowledge that aims at the detection of the ultimate level on which it may be possible that doubts of the rest of knowledge on that subject is removed. For this purpose, it has to go to the foundations of our knowledge to check the importance and stability of it. When the effort is successful, the epistemological effort is not conservative but results in an increase of our confidence in the nature of our knowledge and in the starting of further research. Again the clear nature of a philosophy of knowledge must not be felt to be an effort to establish the aim as being the sole justification of our knowledge as that would be a valid interaction with the outside world. At the same time, only one successful philosophy of knowledge needs to be defined for the objective to be achieved, but this is no reason to avoid the understanding that there are several approaches for justifying and explaining the knowledge. (Floridi, 1996).
Analysis: .
Continental philosophy has a great amount of absurdity at all stages, but analytic philosophy still retains its rigorous logical standards and had always remained a valid form of inquiry. The important role of philosophy has always been to point out the limitations of knowledge that is made available. We have to try to look at one of philosophy's central problems: Cartesian skepticism or external world skepticism. Philosopher Rend Descartes was the first to give global skepticism its classic formulation, but in turn, this led contemporary philosopher Hilary Putnam's brain-in-a-vat scenario, which is a modern version of Descartes' argument and the results are also found to be illuminating. Putnam's present scenario proposition considers the possibility that the ideas of one might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat of nutrients while being hooked up to a computer. This is what stimulates one's brain, and as a result produces all the different experiences that would generally be produced by an external world.
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