The group had 800 to 850 fighters at its height of power but is believed to be down to 250 to 350 fighters dispersed between several different smaller cells [2]. The ASG is known to employ small arms including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars [2]. The ASG has shown regular access to explosives such as C4, TNT and improvised explosive device (IED) materials [2]. Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives have provided the ASG with training in IED construction, car bombs, cell phone initiation systems and guerilla tactics [4]. The ASG's lucrative use of kidnap for ransom resulted in 15 to 20 million USD in revenue for 2000 alone [2]. This cash flow combined with close contacts in the MNLF, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Al-Qaeda and JI have provided a steady source of supplies and munitions to conduct operations. The ASG have also supplemented their revenue stream with small scale Marijuana cultivation and foreign donations from both citizens of Saudi Arabia and Libya [2].
The ASG's traditional operational environment (OE) is mainly Basilan, Sulu and Tawi Tawi Provinces with a presence in Mindanao and occasional operation in Manila City [4]. The AFP's conducted many counter-terrorism operations in 2002 pushing the ASG out of Basilan and the ASG was forced to take sanctuary in Jolo Island [2]. The ASG has attempted to regain a foothold in Basilan by moving small groups back under the protection of the MILF [2]. The ASG conducted multiple ambushes and assassination attempts of AFP personnel in Basilan between 2006 and 2008 [2].
The ASG's lethality and popularity can be directly tied to their leadership at any given period of their history. UAJ founded the ASG in 1991 after being heavily influenced by Wahabist doctrine while fighting in Afghanistan during the late 1980's [4]. UAJ returned to the Philippines to combine a Salafi ideology with the Southern Philippine separatist movement [2].
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